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Counter-insurgency is the dominant aspect in the United States-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, and, since the NATO-led International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has assumed growing respon-
sibility throughout insurgents’ sanctuaries, also a mission for 
Europeans.
According to the U.S. military, insurgency represents an 
intermediate step in the spectrum of conflict, which ranges from 
stable peace to general war.1 The frame in which military opera-
tions are conducted is known as irregular warfare, a violent 
struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and 
influence over a population.2 This form of conflict is charac-
terized by three principle activities: insurgency, counter-insur-
gency, and unconventional warfare, referring to the avoidance of 
direct military confrontation and use instead of indirect methods 
such as terrorism to subvert and exhaust opponents.3 Irregular 
military forces are normally active in these conflicts, although 
conventional forces may also be heavily involved, particularly in 
counter-insurgency efforts.4
Counter-insurgency operations differ from conventional 
operations because of three main factors.5 First, operations are 
often conducted among civilians and troops are mostly lodged 
in urban areas while military outposts are close to agricultural 
activities in rural areas.6 Second, forces opposing Western inter-
vention generally avoid direct military confrontation, instead 
using unconventional methods like terrorist attacks.7 Finally, 
opponents are sometimes difficult to distinguish from peaceable 
civilians until combat erupts.
These circumstances require a degree of caution in the con-
duct of counter-insurgency operations higher than that provided 
for by international humanitarian law (IHL), the law of armed 
conflict.8 Despite the considerable number of issues covered by 
that body of law, its rules — when compared to the complexity 
of modern warfare — are insufficient.
IHL is the lex specialis which applies in armed conflicts. 
When there is a gap (lacuna) in IHL, it should be supplemented 
by human rights law.9 Under the lex specialis doctrine, the more 
specific rule should be understood as the application of a gen-
eral rule to a particular context. The general rule then remains 
relevant in interpreting the specific.10 Assuming that IHL is lex 
specialis and human rights law is the lex generalis, it is evident 
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that ambiguities in the law of war should be resolved by refer-
ence to human rights law.11
Regional human rights treaties and the jurisprudence devel-
oped there under in regional human rights courts should serve 
as persuasive authority when applying and interpreting IHL, in 
particular as evidence of international custom.12 This argument 
has been made by authoritative scholars. For example, accord-
ing to Professor Abresch, “with rules that treat armed conflicts 
as law enforcement operations against terrorists, the ECtHR 
[the European Court of Human Rights] has begun to develop 
an approach that may prove both more protective of victims and 
more politically viable than that of humanitarian law.”13 Peter 
Rowe writes, “[W]hat human rights law can do is to simplify 
what may appear to be a confusing situation.”14 
This paper develops this argument by illustrating how recent 
evolutions in human rights norms, particularly in the jurispru-
dence of the ECtHR, may serve to fill gaps in IHL as applied 
to counter-insurgency operations such as those conducted in 
Afghanistan. First, the paper looks at recent trends in ECtHR 
jurisprudence relating to military or quasi-military situations. 
Second, it looks at the various laws and policies that govern 
troops fighting in Afghanistan. Finally, it compares the applica-
ble IHL and human rights rules on a number of sensitive issues 
regarding the use of lethal force and protection of civilians. 
These examples illustrate that broader human rights rules may 
be more applicable to the counter-insurgency context, when IHL 






































Three wounded children in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, after a U.S. 
bombardment in 2001.
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state.23 Even in the event that they violate local laws, the sending 
state retains the power to judge violators.
Troops deployed in Afghanistan can use all necessary means 
to implement the UN mandate.24 Although not explicit, this 
authorization includes the use of lethal force (1) in self-defense 
or (2) during offensive operations necessary to disrupt insur-
gents’ resistance.
Self-defense is the right to react to an imminent threat, which 
is instant, manifest, and overwhelming.25 The reaction must be 
necessary and proportional. The imminence requirement ensures 
that deadly force will be used only where it is necessary, as a last 
resort, in the exercise of the inherent right of self-preservation. 
Necessity refers to the need to use force at all, while proportion-
ality refers to the degree of force, once it has been established 
that some force is necessary to avoid an attack. Finally, self-
defense is used to justify the use of lethal force in actions which 
can be defined as anticipatory self-defense, for example during 
“troops-in-contact” interventions.26
Offensive operations are also integral to counter-insurgency 
operations.27 The OEF coalition and ISAF have to cooperate in 
order to attain security throughout the country. As the security 
situation potentially justifies the offensive use of force, troops 
are obliged to conduct attacks within the limits of (1) the law 
of armed conflict and (2) rules of engagement (ROE) issued by 
the military authorities. The general legal framework is based on 
customary international law rules regulating the conduct of hos-
tilities,28 under which use of force is premised on the conditions 
of necessity and proportionality. ROE — directives issued by 
competent military authority which delineate the circumstances 
and limitations under which forces will initiate and continue 
combat engagement — explicate in operational terms the inter-
national rules on the conduct of hostilities. ROE represent a 
synthesis of a background resulting from international law and 
case studies.
ihl versus human rights on the use oF lethal 
ForCe and Civilian ProteCtion
In Afghanistan, civilians have been repeatedly hit by aircraft 
in troops-in-contact interventions or caught in armed clashes 
between coalition forces and insurgents.29 Casualties occurred 
predominantly during rapid-reaction strikes, carried out in sup-
port of ground troops after they came under insurgents’ attacks. 
eCthr: human rights PrinCiPles aPPlied to 
military oPerations
The ECtHR, a regional court that adjudicates questions of 
state compliance with the rights set forth in the 1950 European 
Convention on Human Rights, has no competence on law of war 
issues. Nevertheless, the Court has developed a comprehensive 
analysis of constraints on the use of force by a State Party to the 
Convention, even when it is fighting a war, within or outside of 
its borders.
Beginning with the decision in a case concerning an anti-ter-
rorism operation in Gibraltar,15 and culminating with judgments 
related to the second war in Chechnya,16 the Court has produced 
relevant case law on the conduct of military operations. In each 
judgment, the lawfulness of a killing has been tested considering 
the two aspects of the conduct of the operation — the actions 
of the soldiers and the operational responsibility of the chain of 
command — in order to determine whether, under the circum-
stances, soldiers used disproportionate and excessive force and 
whether the state’s authorities failed to plan and control the oper-
ation — whether deliberately, recklessly, or carelessly — thereby 
failing to minimize casualties. The Court has considered various 
facets of the incidents, but has found that operations were not 
planned and executed with the requisite care, emphasizing the 
use of extreme firepower unleashed in congested civilian areas, 
which amounted to the collective targeting of the civilian popu-
lation without credible efforts to distinguish between combatants 
and civilians.
In this analysis, the Court has applied the 1950 Convention, 
treating large battles as law-enforcement episodes.17 Its reason-
ing, however, has touched on the humanitarian law concepts of 
distinction, proportionality, and the prohibition against indis-
criminate attacks.18 The Court’s right-to-life standards resemble 
international norms on the use of force in an armed conflict, but 
the Court required more stringent precautions.19 It stated that 
only certain circumstances render the use of lethal force inevita-
ble, and the so-called collateral damage theory20 may be argued 
only if victims were mistakenly but reasonably believed to be 
combatants or were unintentionally killed by nearby fighting, 
notwithstanding all feasible precautions to avoid or minimize 
incidental loss of civilian life.
overvieW oF laW and PoliCies governing the 
ConduCt oF military oPerations in aFghanistan
Constraints on the use of force during military operations, 
including counter-insurgency, depend on international laws 
and policies, as well as on internal laws of troop-contributing 
states, directives issued by their governments, and local laws. In 
Afghanistan, the normative system which applies to the mission 
is complex. Soldiers have to respect local laws and traditions, 
insofar as they are compatible with accomplishing the UN man-
date.21 The Military Technical Agreement between ISAF and the 
Interim Administration for Afghanistan states, “All ISAF and 
supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, 
enjoying privileges and immunities under this Arrangement will 
respect the laws of Afghanistan, insofar as it is compatible with 
the UNSCR (1386) and will refrain from activities not compat-
ible with the nature of the Mission.”22 Deployed personnel are, 
















U.S. Navy Hospital Corpsman evacuate an Afghanistan National Army 
soldier after he was hit with an IED explosion.
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Unplanned airstrike responses to insurgent attacks are the most 
known incidents of civilian loss of life.30 But NATO has relied 
heavily on air power, which has taken a serious toll on civilian 
lives.31 
Loss of innocent lives during military operations is not a 
per se violation of the law. Rather, IHL prohibits attacks which 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of life and injury to 
civilians, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated.32 Such a dispropor-
tionate attack is considered indiscriminate. The entire matter is 
regulated by the 1977 Additional Protocol I, which supplements 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and provides for 
the protection of war victims. Part IV deals with the conduct of 
hostilities in detail.33 
Under IHL, proportionality is based on the balancing of 
military necessity and humanitarian considerations.34 Article 51 
of Protocol I entails the duty to refrain from exaggerated harm 
to civilians.35 It is based upon a balancing between conflicting 
values and interests, whereas collateral damage to the civilian 
population should be per se so severe that even a military objec-
tive with very substantial benefit could not justify it.36 
In human rights instruments, the level of probability that hos-
tilities will threaten life is taken into account differently, as the 
use of force must be strictly proportionate to the aim of protect-
ing persons against unlawful violence. No military opportunity 
could justify disregard for the lives of civilians. This concept 
should be the overall concept accepted in the law of modern 
warfare.
The point of departure in the analysis of proportionality 
should be the innocent civilians’ right to life. The deprivation 
of civilian life would only be acceptable as an unintended out-
come of a use of force no more than absolutely necessary for 
defending threatened human lives, even during armed conflicts. 
Furthermore, as the ECtHR stated in McCann, “The use of lethal 
force would be rendered disproportionate if the authorities failed, 
whether deliberately or through lack of proper care, to take steps 
which would have avoided the deprivation of life of the suspects 
without putting the lives of others at risk.”37 The European Court 
applied this rule to all cases involving operations of security 
forces, putting on the same level law enforcement, counter-
terrorism operations, and large battles.38 As observed by David 
Kennedy, “The idea of a boundary between law enforcement, 
limited by human rights law, and military action, limited by the 
laws of armed conflict, seems ever less tenable.”39 
The translation of general principles of the law of armed 
conflict into concrete norms for troops takes place by means 
of ROE. ROE synthesize international law and case studies. 
Including a retrospective review of commanders’ decisions as 
well as the analysis of inquiries and judgments on the use of 
lethal force may help to increase implementation of precautions 
required by normative instruments. This review should also draw 
on regional human rights jurisprudence such as ECtHR.
For example, whereas Article 51(2) prescribes that “the civil-
ian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not 
be the object of attack,” this general rule is insufficient without 
further specification. It should specify the absolute prohibi-
tion to target armed combatants located among civilians except 
when those combatants pose an immediate danger to life. Such 
a rule considers the operational environment in a place like 
Afghanistan, where irregular combatants do not differentiate 
themselves from the civilian population, but conceal themselves 
within it, and thus measures to protect civilians from being 
caught up in the conflict are difficult to implement. These rules 
also give due consideration to the fact that, in an asymmetrical 
confrontation, insurgents could respond with no restraint.40 
A second issue concerns warnings. Article 57(2)(c) of 
Additional Protocol I requires that “effective advance warning 
shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian popula-
tion, unless circumstances do not permit.” The striking of a 
village or in a compound whose residents have been warned 
cannot be considered legally justified if there is a reasonable 
possibility that civilians are de facto hostages of the insurgents. 
The assumption that once a warning is issued, a strike against 
combatants who are among the civilians can be validated is fal-
lacious. As stated in Protocol I Article 51(3), civilians can be 
attacked only when they participate directly in hostilities and 
for such time they participate. When non-combatant civilians 
appear to ignore a warning, it does not turn them into volun-
tary human shields and thus legitimate targets. Here, again, the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR provides a broader rule on the obli-
gations of the military in such a situation. In Isayeva v. Russia 
(2005), the Court held that when troops warn civilians to leave 
The point of departure in the analysis of proportionality 
should be the innocent civilians’ right to life. The 
deprivation of civilian life would only be acceptable as 
an unintended outcome of a use of force no more than 
absolutely necessary for defending threatened human 
lives, even during armed conflicts. 
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before an attack, they must also ensure that civilians have a safe 
exit and somewhere to go.41 
Protocol I Article 57(2)(ii) requires all feasible precautions 
in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to 
avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of 
civilian life. This ought to require precisely delivered weapons. 
In Isayeva v. Russia, the ECtHR held on this issue that when the 
military considered the deployment of aircraft equipped with 
heavy combat weapons within the boundaries of a populated 
area or residential compounds, they also should have considered 
the dangers that such methods invariably entail.42 
ConCluding remarks
Provisions regarding the use of force in combat situations 
should seek to create mechanisms that minimize mistakes and 
verify legitimate targets, fulfilling the obligation to refrain from 
harming civilians and the obligation to ensure that civilians are 
not harmed by opposing forces. This goal is more easily accom-
plished when IHL rules are supplemented by jurisprudence 
based on the application of broader human rights principles.
Counter-insurgency operations are conducted amidst civil-
ians and in populated areas. Insurgents use perfidious tactics 
and terrorist means. Nevertheless, loosening the ROE because 
of the uncertainty of a risky environment means externalizing 
risks onto civilians.
ROE consistent with international human rights principles, 
rather, are necessary to save innocent lives and spread the rule 
of law. From a utilitarian point of view, they disrupt consensus 
towards insurgents, win hearts and minds of battered popula-
tions, and facilitate soldiers in returning home safely. After 
Operation Cast Lead in Israel, Colonel Daniel Reisner told 
Haaretz that international law progresses through violations.43 
Law, however, progresses through restraint. HRB
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